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ABSTRACT 
 
Cloud computing helps reduce costs, increase business agility and deploy solutions with a 
high return on investment for many types of applications, including data warehouses and on-
line analytical processing. However, storing and transferring sensitive data into the cloud rais-
es legitimate security concerns. In this paper, we propose a new multi-secret sharing approach 
for deploying data warehouses in the cloud and allowing on-line analysis processing, while 
enforcing data privacy, integrity and availability. We first validate the relevance of our ap-
proach theoretically and then experimentally with both a simple random dataset and the Star 
Schema Benchmark. We also demonstrate its superiority to related methods. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Business intelligence (BI) has been an ever-growing trend for more than twenty years, but the 
recent advent of cloud computing now allows deploying data analytics even more easily. 
While building a traditional BI system typically necessitates an important initial investment, 
with the cloud pay-as-you-go model, users can punctually devote small amounts of resources 
in return for a one-time advantage. This trend is currently supported by numerous “BI as a 
service” offerings, with high economic stakes. 
 
Although cloud computing is currently booming, data security remains a top concern for 
cloud users and would-be users. Some security issues are inherited from classical distributed 
architectures, e.g., authentication, network attacks and vulnerability exploitation, but some 
directly relate to the new framework of the cloud, e.g., cloud service provider or subcontractor 
espionage, cost-effective defense of availability and uncontrolled mashups (Chow et al., 
2009). In the context of cloud BI, privacy is of critical importance. Security issues are current-
ly handled by cloud service providers (CSPs). But with the multiplication of CSPs and sub-
contractors in many countries, intricate legal issues arise, as well as another fundamental is-
sue: trust. Telling whether trust should be placed in CSPs falls back onto end-users, with the 
implied costs. 
 
Critical security concerns in (especially public) cloud storage are depicted in Figure 1. User 
data might be deleted, lost or damaged. First, some CSPs have the policy of taking the highest 
profit. Therefore, unmodified or unaccessed data may be deleted to serve other customers. 
Second, data loss may also be caused by accidental, e.g., electrical or network failure, or in-
tentional plans, e.g., maintenance or system backup. Moreover, virtual cloud architectures 
might not be sufficiently safeguarded from inside attacks. Finally, all CSPs cannot guarantee 
100% data availability, although some cloud businesses must run on a 7/24 basis. Thus, data 
privacy, availability and integrity are major issues in cloud data security. 
  
 
Figure 1. Cloud data security issues. 
 
Encrypting and replicating data can solve most of these issues, but existing solutions are gree-
dy in resources such as data storage, memory, CPU and bandwidth. Moreover, cloud data 
warehouses (DWs) must be both highly protected and effectively refreshed and analyzed 
through on-line analysis processing (OLAP). Thence, while CSPs must optimize service qual-
ity and profit, users seek to reduce storage and access costs within the pay-as-you-go para-
digm. Thus, in cloud DWs, the tradeoff between data security and large-scale OLAP analysis 
poses a great challenge (Chow et al., 2009; Sion, 2007). 
 
To address this challenge, we propose a global approach that relies on a new multi-secret 
sharing scheme, a family of encryption methods that enforce privacy and availability by de-
sign. Moreover, we incorporate in our approach features for data integrity verification and 
computation on shared data (or shares). Eventually, we minimize shared data volume. This 
paper expands (Attasena et al., 2013) along three axes. First, we complement the state of the 
art and deepen our analysis of related works. Second, we detail the section related to sharing a 
DW and specify the way OLAP queries run on shares. Finally, we complement our validation 
effort with new experiments, especially with the Star Schema Benchmark. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first introduce and discuss previous 
research related to our proposal. Based on this diagnosis, we further motivate and position our 
work. Then, we detail our secret sharing-based approach, before providing a security analysis 
and performance evaluation that highlight the relevance of our proposal and demonstrates the 
enhancements it brings over existing methods. We finally conclude this paper and hint at fu-
ture research perspectives. 
 
RELATED WORKS 
 
Existing research solve data privacy, availability and integrity issues by encrypting, anony-
mizing, replicating or verifying data (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Existing data security solutions. 
 
Encryption turns original data into unreadable cipher-text. Modern encryption schemes, such 
as homomorphic (HE – Melchor et al., 2008; Gentry, 2009) and incremental encryption (Bel-
lare et al., 1994), help perform computations and updates on cipher-texts without decrypting 
them first. Partially HE allows only one operation, e.g., addition or multiplication, whereas 
fully HE supports several, but still does not allow mixed-operators. Unfortunately, HE is cur-
rently too computationally expensive for practical use. An older, well-known encryption strat-
egy is secret sharing (Asmuth & Bloom, 1983; Blakley, 1979; Shamir, 1979), which distri-
butes individually meaningless shares of data to n participants to enforce privacy. A subset of 
𝑡 ≤ 𝑛 participants is required to reconstruct the secret. Moreover, up to 𝑛 −  𝑡 participants 
may disappear without compromising data availability. The drawback of this solution is the 
multiplication of the initial data volume by the number of participants. Modern secret sharing 
schemes, such as multi-secret sharing (Liuet al., 2012; Waseda & Soshi, 2012), verifiable 
secret sharing (Bu & Zhou, 2009), and verifiable multi-secret sharing (Bu & Yang, 2013; Es-
lami & Ahmadabadi, 2010; Hu et al., 2012), help reduce the volume of shares, verify the ho-
nesty of each participant, and both, respectively. 
 
Data anonymization (Cormode & Srivastava, 2009; Kenneally & Claffy, 2010; Machanavajj-
hala et al., 2007; Sweeney, 2002) is also used to enforce data privacy. In a database, only keys 
or sensitive information are protected (Sedeyao, 2012). Thus, data anonymization straightfor-
wardly allows data querying. There are several models (e.g., 𝑘-anonymized, 𝑙-diversity) and 
techniques (hashing, hiding, permutation, shift…) to protect keys and sensitive information, 
respectively. For example, the 𝑘-anonymized model transforms 𝑘 distinguishable records into 
𝑘 indistinguishable records (Sweeney, 2002). The 𝑙-diversity model creates 𝑙 different sensi-
tive values from only one value in each key identification combination (Machanavajjhala et 
al., 2007). While cheap when accessing data, anonymization is not strong enough to protect 
against attacks such as homogeneity and background knowledge attacks (Sedeyao, 2012), and 
is not designed to address data availability and integrity issues. 
 
Data replication (Padmanabhan et al., 2008) is the process of copying some or all data from 
one location to one or several others. Its main purposes are to improve availability, fault-
tolerance and/or accessibility. A well-known data replication scheme is Reed Solomon (RS) 
code (Thomas & Schwarz, 2002), which is quite similar to secret sharing. RS code indeed 
distributes data amongst a group of participants and can reconstruct data even if some partici-
pants disappear, thus enforcing availability. RS code and secret sharing mostly differ in their 
driving goals, i.e., availability and privacy, respectively. 
 
Data verification (Bowers et al., 2009; Juels & Kaliski, 2007; Shacham & Waters, 2008; 
Wang et al., 2009) is the process of checking data integrity, by verifying data corruption 
caused by either accident or intruder attack, with the help of signatures (digital signature, 
message authentication, fingerprint…). However, since signature creation typically involves 
random or hash functions, they cannot guarantee 100% data correctness. Moreover, so-called 
outer code verifying methods (Juels & Kaliski, 2007) allow checking encrypted data without 
decrypting them first. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the features of the above security approaches, with respect to data priva-
cy, availability, integrity and full access. No existing approach simultaneously satisfies all 
criteria. 
 
Approaches 
Data 
Privacy 
Data  
availability 
Data 
Integrity 
Data access 
Encryption     
- Homomorphic encryption √   On encrypted data without decryption. 
- Incremental encryption √   On encrypted data without decryption. 
- Secret sharing √ √  Summing and averaging shares 
- Multi-secret sharing √ √   
- Verifiable secret sharing √ √ √  
- Verifiable multi-secret sharing √ √ √  
Data anonymization √   On non-anonymized data 
Data replication(RS code)  √   
Data verification   √  
 
Table 1. Comparison of data security solutions. 
 
Eventually, some security solutions directly relate to ours. Most apply Shamir’s (1979) clas-
sical secret sharing to relational databases or data warehouses (Emekci et al., 2006; Hadavi & 
Jalili, 2010), thus, enforcing data privacy, availability and updating. In addition, Thompson et 
al. (2009), Wang et al. (2011) and Hadavi et al. (2012) also support data verification through 
HE, a hash function, and checksums and a hash function, respectively. Most of these methods 
allow computing at least one query type (aggregation, range and match queries) on shares. 
 
As in the three last cited approaches (here after denoted TWH for brevity), our strategy is to 
extend one security scheme presenting interesting characteristics, namely multi-secret sharing, 
by integrating the missing features needed in cloud DWs. However, in our approach, shared 
data volume is better controlled than in TWH’s, i.e., it is significantly lower than 𝑛 times that 
of the original data volume. Moreover, we also incorporate both inner and outer code data 
verification in our solution, whereas TWH only feature inner code data verification. Finally, 
we also include capabilities from homomorphic and incremental encryption that allow updat-
ing and computing basic operations on shares. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, our multi-
secret sharing-based approach is the first attempt at securing data warehousing and OLAP 
while minimizing data volume. 
 
MULTI-SECRET SHARING OF CLOUD DATA WAREHOUSES 
 
The solution we propose is based on trusting neither CSPs nor network data transfers. It is 
subdivided into two schemes. Scheme-I is a new multi secret sharing scheme that transforms 
data into blocks (to optimize computing and storage costs), and shares data blocks at several 
CSPs’. Each CSP only stores part of the shares, which are not exploitable, neither by the CSP 
nor any intruder, because they have been transformed by a mathematical function. Though 
performing computations on shares is possible, i.e., data need not be decrypted, it yields mea-
ningless results. It is only when all results are mathematically transformed back at the user’s 
that they can be reconstructed into global, meaningful information. Individual shares and 
computed results being encrypted, network transfers to and from CSPs are thus safe. Hence, 
privacy is achieved at any point outside of the user’s (network, providers). Finally, to verify 
the honesty of CSPs and the correctness of shares, we incorporate into Scheme-I two types of 
hash-based signatures. Signatures help verify data correctness in case some CSPs are not hon-
est, and incorrect or erroneous data before decryption. 
 
However, updating and querying data are still difficult and expensive in Scheme-I, because 
data pieces are dependent on the others in the same block. Thus, Scheme-II builds upon 
Scheme-I to actually allow sharing and querying a DW in the cloud. Assuming a DW stored 
in a relational database, each attribute value in each record is shared independently. We first 
transform each attribute value to at least one block, depending on data type and size (e.g., one 
block for integers, reals or characters; and 𝑙 blocks for strings of length 𝑙), and encrypt each 
data block with Scheme-I. Then, we allow analyzing data over shares with ad-hoc queries and 
Relational OLAP (ROLAP) operations, without decrypting all data first whenever possible. 
All basic OLAP operations (roll-up, drill-down, some slice and dice, pivot and drill-across) 
can apply directly on shares at the CSPs’, with results being reconstructed at the user’s. How-
ever, other complex queries must be transformed or split first, depending on operations and 
functions used. 
 
Scheme-I:  𝒎, 𝒏, 𝒕  Multi-secret sharing with data verification 
 
Scheme-I is an  𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑡  multi-secret sharing scheme: 𝑚 data pieces are encrypted and shared 
among 𝑛 CSPs. 𝑡 out of 𝑛 shares can reconstruct the original data. The total volume of shares 
is only about 𝑚𝑛  𝑡 − 1  . Data are organized into blocks that are encrypted and decrypted all 
at once. The priorities of blocks and data in the blocks are important because they directly 
affect the results of data access in Scheme-II. All data pieces in a block are encrypted at once 
by 𝑛 distinct random 𝑡-variable linear equations, where variables are data and their signatures 
and coefficients are pseudorandom. Eventually, we introduce two types of signatures. The 
first, inner signature is created from all data pieces in one block. It matches with data in the 
reconstruction process if CSPs return correct shares. The second, outer signature is created 
from each share. At each CSP’s, it verifies shares before transferring them back to the user for 
reconstruction. 
 
Parameters of Scheme-I are listed in Table 2. 𝐼𝐷𝑖=1..𝑚  are randomly selected from distinct 
integers and are stored at the user's. 𝐷 is split into 𝑜 blocks with 𝑜 =  
𝑚
𝑡−1
 . If 𝑚 is not a mul-
tiple of 𝑡 − 1, the last block is padded with integer values -1 (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Table 2. Scheme-I parameters. 
Parameters Definitions 
𝑛 Number of CSPs 
𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘  CSP number 𝑘 
𝑚 Number of data pieces 
𝑜 Number of data blocks 
𝑡 Number of shares necessary for reconstructing original data 
𝑃 A big prime number 
𝐷 Original data such that 𝐷 =  𝑑1 , … , 𝑑𝑚   and 𝐷 =  𝑏1 , … , 𝑏𝑜  
𝑑𝑖  The 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  piece of 𝐷 in integer format such that 𝑃 − 2 > 𝑑𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑏𝑗  The 𝑗
𝑡ℎ  block of 𝐷 such that 𝑏𝑗 =  𝑑 𝑗−1  𝑡−1 , … , 𝑑 𝑗   𝑡−1   
𝐼𝐷𝑘  Identifier number of 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘  such that 𝐼𝐷𝑘 > 0 
𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘  Share of 𝑏𝑗  stored at 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘  
𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑗  Signature of original data in 𝑏𝑗  such that 𝑃 > 𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑗 ≥ 0 
𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 ,𝑘  Signature of share of 𝑏𝑗  stored at 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘  
  
 
Figure 3. Organization of data in blocks. 
 
Data sharing process 
 
Each data block is encrypted independently (Figure 4). Data pieces in block 𝑏𝑗  are encrypted 
as follows. 
1. Compute signature 𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑗  from data block 𝑏𝑗  with homomorphic function 𝐻1: 𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑗 =
𝐻1 𝑏𝑗  . 
2. Create 𝑛 distinct random 𝑡 − 1 linear equations (Equation 1).  
𝑦 = 𝑓𝑘 𝑥1, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑡 =    𝑥ℎ + 2 × 𝑎𝑘 ,ℎ
𝑡−1
ℎ=1  +  𝑥𝑡 × 𝑎𝑘 ,𝑡    (1) 
where 𝑥𝑖  is positive variable, 𝑎𝑘ℎ  is the ℎ
th
 positive pseudorandom coefficient seeded 
at 𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 𝑃 > 𝑎𝑘 ,ℎ ≥ 0 and 𝑓𝑘1 ≠ 𝑓𝑘2 if 𝑘1 ≠ 𝑘2. These functions are used for all 
blocks. 
3. Compute the set of shares  𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘 𝑘=1...𝑛  from data block 𝑏𝑗  such that 𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘 =
𝑓𝑘 𝑏𝑗 , 𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑗  , and distribute each share 𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘  to 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘 . 
4. Compute signatures  𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 ,𝑘 𝑘=1...𝑛with hash function 𝐻2 such that 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 ,𝑘 =
𝐻2 𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘 , and distribute each signature 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 ,𝑘 to 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘  along with 𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘 . 
 
Thus, data and their signatures are shared among 𝑛 CSPs. 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘  stores 𝑜 pairs of shares and 
signatures   𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘 , 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 ,𝑘 𝑗 =1…𝑜 .  
 
 
 
Figure 4.Data sharing process. 
 
Data reconstruction process 
 
A dataset D is reconstructed from shares and signatures  𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘 , 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 ,𝑘 𝑗 =1…𝑜  stored at 
𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘 ∈ 𝐺, where 𝐺 is any group of t CSPs (Figure 5). There are two phases to reconstruct 
original data: the initialization phase and the actual reconstruction phase. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.Data reconstruction process. 
 
Initialization phase: In this phase, share correctness is verified and a matrix 𝐶 that is used in 
the reconstruction phase is created as follows. 
 
1. Verify information at all 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘 ∈ 𝐺. At each CSP’s, only shares to be decrypted are 
verified for correctness. Share 𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘  is correct if 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 ,𝑘 = 𝐻2 𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘 . In case of error at 
𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘 , then another CSP is selected and correctness is verified again. 
2. At the user’s, matrix 𝐴 is created from 𝐼𝐷𝑘  of 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘 ∈ 𝐺 such that 𝐴 =  𝑎𝑥 ,𝑦  𝑡×𝑡 , 
where 𝑎𝑥 ,𝑦  is the 𝑦
𝑡ℎ  coefficient of 𝑓𝑥 . Then, 𝐶 is computed such that 𝐶 = 𝐴
−1. Let 
𝑐𝑥 ,𝑦  be an entry in the 𝑥
𝑡ℎ  row and the 𝑦𝑡ℎ  column of matrix 𝐶. 
 
Reconstruction phase: To decrypt data block𝑏𝑗 , share 𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘  of 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘 ∈ 𝐺 is transferred to the 
user and decrypted as follows. 
 
1. Compute data block 𝑏𝑗  (Equation 2) and its signature 𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑗  (Equation 3). 
𝑑 𝑗−1  𝑡−1 +𝑙 =   𝑐𝑙 ,ℎ × 𝑒𝑗 ,ℎ
𝑡
ℎ=1  − 2; ∀ 1, 𝑡 − 1                        (2) 
𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑗 =  𝑐𝑡 ,ℎ × 𝑒𝑗 ,ℎ
𝑡
ℎ=1         (3) 
2. If 𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑗 = 𝐻1 𝑏𝑗  , then data in block 𝑏𝑗  are correct. In case of errors, the user can re-
construct data from shares from a new 𝐺. 
 
Scheme-II: Sharing a data warehouse in the cloud 
 
In this section, we exploit Scheme-I to share a DW among CSPs. Databases attribute values, 
except NULL values and primary or foreign keys, are shared in relational databases at CSPs’. 
Keys help match records in the data reconstruction process and perform JOIN and GROUP 
BY operations. Any sensitive primary key, such as a social security number, is replaced by an 
unencrypted sequential integer key. Each attribute in the original tables is transformed into 
two attributes in encrypted tables, i.e., share and signature attributes. Figure 6 shows the ex-
ample of a PRODUCT table that is shared among three CSPs. To handle data from a shared 
DW, we propose solutions to encrypt data of various types, to share the customary DW logi-
cal models in the cloud, to perform loading, backup and recovery processes, and to analyze 
shared data through ROLAP operations. 
 
 
(a) Original data 
 
(b) Shares at 𝐶𝑆𝑃1 
 
(c) Shares at 𝐶𝑆𝑃2 
 
(d) Shares at 𝐶𝑆𝑃3 
 
Figure 6. Example of original data and shares at three CSPs’. 
 
Data types 
 
To handle the usual data types featured in databases, we encrypt and handle each data piece 
independently. Data pieces of any type are first transformed into integers, then split into one 
or several data blocks (depending on type and value), and finally encrypted with Scheme-I. 
  
For sharing an integer, date or timestamp 𝐼, 𝐼 is split into 𝑡 − 1 pieces 𝑑𝑖=1… 𝑡−1  such that 
𝑑𝑖 =  
𝐼
𝑝 𝑖−1
 mod 𝑝, where 𝑝 is a prime number and  𝑝 >
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡  
𝑡−1
 bits, where  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡  is 
the size of the maximum integer value in bits. Then, 𝑑𝑖=1… 𝑡−1  is encrypted to 𝑛 shares with 
Scheme-I. 
 
For sharing a real 𝑅, 𝑅 is transformed into an integer 𝐼 by multiplication. For example, let 𝑅 
be stored in numeric format (𝑣, 𝑠), where 𝑣 is a precision value and 𝑠 a scale value. Then, 𝑅 
is transformed into 𝐼 = 𝑅 × 10 𝑠 . 𝐼 can then be encrypted as any integer. 
 
For sharing a character 𝐿, 𝐿 is transformed into an integer 𝐼through its ASCII code. For ex-
ample, let 𝐿 be ’A’. 𝐿 is transformed into 𝐼 = 65. 𝐼 can then be encrypted as any integer. 
 
For sharing a string 𝑆, 𝑆 is transformed into a set of integers  𝐼𝑗  𝑗 =1…𝑙  where 𝑙 is the length of 
𝑆, using the ASCII code of each character in 𝑆. For example, let 𝑆 be ’ABC’. Then, 𝑆 is trans-
formed into  𝐼𝑗  𝑗 =1…3 =
 65, 66, 67 . After transformation, each character 𝐼𝑗  is encrypted in-
dependently as any integer. 
 
For sharing a binary string 𝐵, 𝐵 is transformed into a set of integers  𝐼𝑗  𝑗 =1… 𝑙
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡  
 
 where 𝑙 
is the length of 𝐵 and  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡  is the size of the maximum integer value in bits. For exam-
ple, let 𝐵 = 1000000000000000000000000000000011  and  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 32 bits. Then 𝐵 
is split into two smaller binaries: 10 and 00000000000000000000000000000011 sizing less 
than  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡 , which are then transformed into  𝐼𝑗  𝑗 =1,2 =
 2, 3 . After transformation, each 
𝐼𝑗  is encrypted independently as any integer. 
 
An example of sharing an integer 𝐼 follows. 
1. Sharing parameters are assigned as follows: 𝑛 =  4, 𝑡 =  3 and 𝑝 =  13. 
2. Homomorphic and hash functions are 𝐻1 𝑏𝑗  =  𝑑𝑖 mod 𝑝 𝑑𝑖∈𝑏𝑗  and 𝐻2 𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘 =
𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘  mod 13. 
3. Let 𝐼 = 75, i.e., the shirt’s unit price in Figure 6(a). 
4. We compute 𝑑𝑖=1,2 as follows: 𝑑1 =  
75
131−1
 mod 13 = 10 and 
𝑑2 =  
75
132−1
 mod 13 = 5. 
5. We compute 𝑠_𝑖𝑛1 = 𝐻1 𝑏1  =   10 + 5  mod 13 =  2. 
6. Let four random 3-variable linear equations be: 
a. 𝑦 = 𝑓1 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 = 1 ×  𝑥1 + 2 + 0 ×  𝑥2 + 2 + 2 × 𝑥3, 
b. 𝑦 = 𝑓2 𝑥1, 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 = 3 ×  𝑥1 + 2 + 1 ×  𝑥2 + 2 + 0 × 𝑥3, 
c. 𝑦 = 𝑓3 𝑥1, 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 = 2 ×  𝑥1 + 2 + 1 ×  𝑥2 + 2 + 1 × 𝑥3, 
d. 𝑦 = 𝑓4 𝑥1, 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 = 0 ×  𝑥1 + 2 + 2 ×  𝑥2 + 2 + 1 × 𝑥3. 
7. We compute 𝑒1,𝑘=1…4 such that 𝑒1,1 = 𝑓1 10,5,2 = 1 ×  10 + 2 + 0 ×  5 + 2 +
2 × 2=16. Similarly, 𝑒1,2 = 43, 𝑒1,3 = 33 and 𝑒1,4 = 14. 
8. We compute 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡1,𝑘=1…4 such that 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡1,1 = 𝐻2 16 = 16 mod 7 = 2. Similarly, 
𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡1,2 = 1, 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡1,3 = 5 and 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡1,4 = 0. 
9. We distribute each couple  𝑒1,𝑘 , 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡1,𝑘  to 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑘 . 
 
Then, 𝐼 is reconstructed as follows. 
1. Suppose 𝐶𝑆𝑃1, 𝐶𝑆𝑃2 and 𝐶𝑆𝑃3 are selected into 𝐺. 
2. We verify 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡1,𝑗=1,2,3 such that 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡1,1
′ = 𝐻2 16 = 16 mod 7 = 2 = 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡1,1. 
Then 𝑒1,1 is correct. After verification, all three shares  𝑒1,1, 𝑒1,2, 𝑒1,3  are found cor-
rect. 
3. We create matrix 𝐴 from 𝐼𝐷𝑖=1,2,3: 𝐴 =  
1 0 2
3 1 0
2 1 1
 . 
4. We compute matrix 𝐶 =  𝐴−1 mod 𝑃 =
 
1 2 −2
−3 −3 6
1 −1 1
 
3
 
5. We compute 𝑑𝑖=1,2 as follows. 
a. 𝑑1 =   16 × 1 + 43 × 2 + 33 × −2 3  − 2 = 10. 
b. 𝑑2 =   16 × −3 + 43 × −3 + 33 × 6 3  − 2 = 5. 
6. We compute 𝑠_𝑖𝑛1 =  16 × 1 + 43 × −1 + 33 × 1 3 = 2. 
7. We verify the original data. The result is correct since 𝑠_𝑖𝑛1
′ = 𝐻1 𝑏1 =
 10 + 5  mod 13 = 2 = 𝑠_𝑖𝑛1. 
 
Data warehouse sharing 
 
Since each table of a shared DW is stored in a relational database at a given CSP’s and each 
attribute value in each record is encrypted independently, Scheme-II straightforwardly helps 
implement any DW logical model, i.e., star, snowflake or constellation schema. Figures 7(a) 
and 7(b) show an example of snowflake-modeled DW that is shared among three CSPs. Each 
shared DW bears the same schema as the original DW’s, but type and size of each attribute in 
each shared table differ from the original tables. All attribute types, except Booleans that are 
not encrypted to save computation and data storage costs, are indeed transformed into integ-
ers. 
 
 
 
(a) Original schema 
 
(b) Transformed schemas at CSPs’ (c) Sample shared cube-I 
 
Figure 7. Example of shared data warehouse and cube. 
 
Moreover, Scheme-II supports the storage of data cubes that optimize response time and 
bandwidth when performing ROLAP operations. Cubes are physically stored into tables that 
are shared among CSPs, retaining the same structure. For example, Figure 7(c) features a 
shared cube named cube-I that totalizes total prices and numbers of sales by time period and 
by product. Shared cubes include signatures for shared aggregate measures and customarily 
use NULL values to encode superaggregates. Finally, indices can also be shared to improve 
query performance. However, they must be created from the original data before the sharing 
process. We envisage lazy index creation on shares in future research, though. 
 
Loading, backup and recovery processes 
 
For loading data into a shared DW, each data piece is encrypted and loaded independently. 
New data can be loaded without decrypting previous data first, because each attribute value in 
each record is encrypted independently. For instance, in Figure 8, data from Figure 6 are al-
ready shared and the last record (#126) is new. 
 
 
(a) Original data 
 
(b) Shares at 𝐶𝑆𝑃1  
 
(c) Shares at 𝐶𝑆𝑃2  
 
(d) Shares at 𝐶𝑆𝑃3  
 
Figure 8. Example of sharing new data. 
 
However, when updating cubes, some shared aggregates may have to be recomputed. Within 
Scheme-II, we currently cannot apply all aggregation operations on shares. Thus, such aggre-
gations still require to be computed on the original data. For example, maximum and mini-
mum cannot be computed on shares because original data order is lost in the sharing process. 
Averaging data must be performed by summing and counting. Hence, to optimize costs, ag-
gregates are first computed on new data, and then aggregated to relevant existing shares, 
which are decrypted on-the-fly. 
 
Finally, a backup process is unnecessary in our scheme, because each share 𝑒𝑗 ,𝑙  is actually a 
backup share of all other shares 𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘 , where 𝑘 ∈  1, … , 𝑙 − 1, 𝑙 + 1, … , 𝑛 . In case a share is 
erroneous, it can be recovered from 𝑡 other shares. 
 
Data analysis over shares 
 
Since DWs and cubes can be shared in the cloud, Scheme-II directly supports all basic OLAP 
operations at the CSPs’ through SQL operators and aggregation functions, and helps recon-
struct the result on the user’s side by performing queries on shared tables. For example, query 
“select YearID, YearName, TotalPrice from cube-I, year where cube-I.YearID=year.YearID 
and MonthID=null and DateID=null and CategoryID=null and ProdNo=null” can be run at t 
CSPs to compute the total price of products per year.  
 
However, although some queries apply directly onto shares, others require some or all data to 
be decrypted. Simple SELECT/FROM queries directly apply onto shares. All join operators, 
when operating on unencrypted keys, also apply directly. However, when expressing condi-
tions in a WHERE or HAVING clause, the following routine must be followed: 
1. encrypt compared values, 
2. substitute these shares to compared values in the query, 
3. launch the query on t shares, 
4. decrypt the t results, 
5. reconstruct the global result by intersection. 
 
For example, the query “SELECT ProdName FROM Product WHERE UnitPrice=75” would 
be transformed to “SELECT ProdName FROM Product WHERE UnitPrice=16” at 𝐶𝑆𝑃1, 
where 16 is the share of 75 at 𝐶𝑆𝑃1. 
 
This routine works for many comparison operators (=, ≠, EXISTS, IN, LIKE…) and their 
conjunction, but when ordering is necessary, as in ORDER BY clauses and many comparison 
operators (>, <, ≥, ≤, BETWEEN…), it can no longer apply since the original order is broken 
when sharing data. Thus, all fetched data must be reconstructed at the client’s before the result 
can be computed by an external program. However, some range queries can be transformed 
and performed on shares if comparison range is known and comparison attribute type is integ-
er, char or string. For example, the query “SELECT ProdName FROM Product WHERE Un-
itPrice between 75 and 77” would be transformed to “SELECT ProdName FROM Product 
WHERE UnitPrice IN (16, 19, 22)” at 𝐶𝑆𝑃1, where 16, 19 and 22 are the shares of 75, 76 and 
77 at 𝐶𝑆𝑃1., respectively. 
 
Similarly, aggregation functions SUM, AVG and COUNT can directly apply on shares, whe-
reas other aggregation functions, such as MAX and MIN, require all original data to be recon-
structed prior to computation. Finally, grouping queries using the GROUP BY or GROUP BY 
CUBE clauses can directly apply if and only if they target unencrypted key attributes. Again, 
grouping by other attribute(s) requires all data to be reconstructed at the user’s before aggre-
gation by an external program. 
 
Consequently, executing a complex query may require either transforming or splitting the 
query, depending on its clauses and operators, following the above guidelines. Figure 9 shows 
an example of complex query execution.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. Example of complex query execution over shares. 
 
SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
In this section, we illustrate the relevance of our approach along two axes. First, we mainly 
theoretically study the security features of our schemes, which are our primary focus. Second, 
since our approach applies in the cloud, we both theoretically and experimentally study the 
factors that influence cost in the pay-as-you-go paradigm, i.e., computing, storage and data 
transfer costs, with respect to the TWH secret sharing schemes. 
 
Security analysis 
 
Privacy 
 We focus here on data pilfering. Neither a CSP nor any intruder can decrypt original data 
from only one share, and data transferred between the user and CSPs are all encrypted. In case 
an intruder can steal shares from 𝑥 CSPs with 𝑥 ≤ 𝑡, the probability of discovering 𝑏𝑗  (the 
original data in the 𝑗𝑡ℎ  block) remains low, i.e., 
1
𝑃2𝑡−𝑥−1
 and 
1
𝑝2𝑡−𝑥−1
 in Scheme-I and Scheme-
II, respectively (Figure 10). The probability of discovering 𝑏𝑗  depends on the following. 
 
1. The size of control parameters 𝑃 in Scheme-I and 𝑝 in Scheme-II. In Scheme-I, the 
probability of breaking the secret is low because 𝑃 is a big prime number. In Scheme-
II, the probability of breaking the secret ranges between 10−22 and 10−10 in Fig-
ure 10’s example, because 𝑝 depends on 𝑡. If p = 𝑃, the probabilities of breaking the 
secret are equal in both schemes, but storage cost in Scheme-II is not controlled, 
which falls back to Shamir’s (1979) case. 
2. The user-defined value of 𝑡. The higher 𝑡, the lower the probability of breaking the se-
cret. 
3. The number of pilfered shares 𝑥. The probability of breaking the secret obviously in-
creases with x. However, both our schemes are secure enough since it is difficult to re-
trieve shares from at least 𝑡 CSPs by attacking them simultaneously. 
 
  
(a) Scheme-I (b) Scheme-II 
 
Figure 10.Probability of decrypting a data block from its shares. 
 
Within Scheme-II, although some data can be decrypted, if an intruder steals all data from one 
CSP, s/he must discover the pattern of data blocks and generate all 𝑝𝑡−1 combinations of data 
pieces stored at the 𝑡 − 1 other CSPs’ by brute force. The complexity of Scheme-II’s recon-
structing process is 𝑂 𝑚𝑡2 , since the 𝑡 × 𝑡 𝐶 matrix must be computed for 𝑚 data pieces. 
Thus, with 𝑝 = 99,991, 𝑡 = 3 and 𝑚 = 100 (11 KB of data), breaking the secret with a stan-
dard desktop computer would take more than 13 years. Thence, even with a botnet available, 
even partially decrypting a giga or terabyte-scale DW cannot be achieved in reasonable time. 
 
Reliability 
 
Reliability includes data availability and recovery, which are achieved by design with secret 
sharing, and data integrity and correctness. Our schemes can verify both the honesty of CSPs 
and the correctness of shares. Verification performance depends on the user-defined hash 
functions that define inner and outer signatures.  
 
To test the reliability of our signatures, we generate random 32-bits unsigned integers and 
share them. Then, we generate errors in all shares with respect to a given pattern. Finally, we 
account the number of incorrect data pieces that are not detected as such. Figure 11 plots the 
ratio of false positives achieved with inner signature 𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑗 = 𝑑𝑖 mod 𝑝 𝑑𝑖∈𝑏𝑗  and outer signa-
ture 𝑠_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗 ,𝑘 = 𝑒𝑗 ,𝑘mod 𝑝2, where 𝑝2 is a prime. If only the inner signature is used to verify 
data, i.e., only the honesty of CSPs is verified, the ratio ranges between 7.7E-6% and 3.2E-
2%, inversely depending on 𝑝. However, all incorrect data pieces can be detected if data are 
verified by both inner and outer signatures (i.e., share correctness is also verified) and 
𝑝2 > 61. 
 
 
 
Figure 11.Rate of incorrect data not being detected. 
 
Finally, note that sharing data on one node is a surjective function, i.e., two different initial 
values may have the same share value. However, since the reconstruction process is achieved 
by intersection from all nodes, sharing data is overall a bijective function. Thus, querying 
shares always results in a 100% hit rate. 
 
Cost analysis 
 
In this section, we provide a cost analysis of the main factors inducing costs when storing a 
DW in the cloud. For this sake, in addition to theoretical considerations, we run two series of 
experiments. In the first series of experiments, we run 100 1 GB test cases made of 32-bits 
unsigned integers and vary parameters 𝑡, 𝑛 and 𝑝. In the second series of experiments, we use 
the Star Schema Benchmark (SSB – O’Neil et al., 2009) and vary parameter 𝑝 with 𝑡 = 3 and 
𝑛 = 4. Experiments are conducted with Bloodshed Dev-C++ 5.5.3 and MySQL 5.0.51a on a 
PC with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 2.76 GHz processor with 3 GB of RAM running Microsoft 
Windows 7. 
 
Computing cost 
 
The time complexity of Scheme-I’s data sharing process is 𝑂 𝑜𝑛𝑡 , since 𝑛 𝑡-variable linear 
equations must be computed for 𝑜 data blocks. Moreover, since 𝑚 = 𝑜(𝑡 − 1), complexity 
can also be expressed as 𝑂 𝑚𝑛 . The time complexity of Scheme-II’s data sharing process is 
also 𝑂 𝑜𝑛𝑡 , or 𝑂 𝑚𝑛𝑡  since 𝑚 = 𝑜 here. 
 
The time complexity of Scheme-I’s data reconstruction process is 𝑂 𝑚𝑡  or 𝑂 𝑜𝑡2 , since the 
𝑡 × 𝑡 𝐶 matrix must be computed for 𝑜 data blocks and 𝑜 =  
𝑚
𝑡−1
 . Scheme-II’s is 𝑂 𝑚𝑡2  or 
𝑂 𝑜𝑡2 , since 𝐶 must be computed for 𝑜 data blocks and 𝑜 = 𝑚. 
 For example, the execution time of sharing and reconstructing 32-bits unsigned integers with 
Scheme-II is plotted in Figure 12 with respect to 𝑡 and 𝑛. The execution time of both 
processes increase with 𝑡 when 𝑡 = 𝑛. The execution time of the sharing process increases 
with 𝑛 when 𝑡 is fixed, whereas 𝑛 does not affect reconstruction. For instance, the execution 
time of the data sharing and reconstruction processes are about 15 seconds (throughput is 
68 MB/s) and 7 seconds (throughput is 144 MB/s) when 𝑛 = 𝑡 = 3 and 𝑝 = 99991.  
 
  
 
Figure 12.Execution time of Scheme-II. 
 
To evaluate the performance of data analysis on shares more accurately, we measure the ex-
ecution time of SSB’s OLAP query workload (Table 3). Quite unexpectedly, query execution 
is faster on shares than on the original DW. But this is because we run plain SSB queries on 
the original DW and MySQL does not optimize joins natively. When executing the same 
query on shares, we have to split the original queries and process subqueries before joining, 
thus implicitly optimizing join dimensionality. Query response on shares appears reasonable, 
though it could be further enhanced through shared indices and materialized views. 
 
SSB query 
Query response time (seconds) Query result size 
Original query Scheme-II query Original query (bytes) Scheme-II query (KB) 
Q.1.1 8 10 12 7,751 
Q.1.2 4 4 11 176 
Q.1.3 3 4 11 32 
Q.2.1 80 25 6,097 930 
Q.2.2 80 7 1,232 388 
Q.2.3 80 4 1,232 28 
Q.3.1 78 49 2,460 16,343 
Q.3.2 66 8 14,400 864 
Q.3.3 64 5 567 25 
Q.3.4 64 4 72 5 
Q.4.1 80 54 756 13614 
Q.4.2 81 36 2,760 3531 
Q.4.3 66 5 9,936 11 
Average 58 17 3,042 3,361 
 
Table 3.OLAP performance with SSB. 
 
Storage cost 
 
One advantage of our schemes is that the volume of shares nears that of original data when 
𝑛 =  𝑡, 𝑡 is big, and 𝑃 in Scheme-I and 𝑝 in Scheme-II are small. Shared data volume is only 
𝑜𝑛 𝑃  in Scheme-I and 𝑜𝑛 𝑝  in Scheme-II, where  𝑃  and  𝑝  are sizes of 𝑃 and 𝑝, re-
spectively. For example, with Scheme-II, let us consider a set 𝐷 of ten 32-bits unsigned integ-
ers that is shared among six CSPs, with five CSPs being sufficient to reconstruct 𝐷. The vo-
lume of 𝐷 is 10 × 32 = 320 bits. Let  𝑝  = 9 bits. Then, the volume of all shares is lower 
than 10 × 6 × 9 = 540 bits (1.69 × 𝐷). The volume of each share is about 10 × 9 = 90 bits 
(0.17 × 𝐷). 
 
The volume of our shared 32-bit unsigned integer dataset using Scheme-II is plotted in Fig-
ure 13. The volume of each share varies with respect to 𝑛, 𝑡 and 𝑝. The volume of all shares 
ranges between 
𝑛
𝑡−1
 and 𝑛 times the volume of 𝐷. For example, it is 1.89 GB (
3
3−1
= 1.5 ≤
1.89 ≤ 3) when the volume of original data is 1 GB, 𝑛 = 𝑡 = 3 and 𝑝 = 99991. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Shared data volume. 
 
Finally, Table 4 shows the volume of SSB’s DW, once shared with Scheme-II. The volume of 
each share is still smaller than that of the original DW (about 46% smaller). Therefore, this 
guarantees any shared DW can be stored and queried if the original DW can. If data volume is 
very large, a higher-performance DBMS can be envisaged, e.g., a parallel DBMS or low-level 
distributed storage. Although, the volume of all shares is greater than that of original data  
(about 185% greater), it is smaller than twice that of original data. Shared volume may be 
reduced to about 139% of original data if the data availability constraint is relaxed, though. 
 
Table 
Original SSB 1st share 2nd share 3th share 4th share All shares 
Volume 
(KB) 
Volume 
(KB) 
%(1) Volume 
(KB) 
%(1) Volume 
(KB) 
%(1) Volume 
(KB) 
%(1) Volume 
(KB) 
%(1) 
Customer 3,167 2,550 80.52 2,550 80.52 2,550 80.52 2,550 80.52 10,200 322.07 
Date 218 205 94.04 205 94.04 205 94.04 205 94.04 820 376.15 
Part 18,798 14,940 79.48 14,940 79.48 14,940 79.48 14,940 79.48 59,760 317.91 
Supplier 965 768 79.59 758 78.55 758 78.55 758 78.55 3,042 315.23 
Lineorder 822,929 373,610 45.40 373,610 45.40 373,610 45.40 373,610 45.40 1,494,440 181.60 
All tables 846,077 392,073 46.34 392,063 46.34 392,063 46.34 392,063 46.34 1,568,262 185.36 
(1)Percentage of original data volume. 
 
Table 4. SSB shared data warehouse volume achieved with Scheme-II. 
 
Data transfer cost 
 
In our context, data transfer cost only relates to the size of query results, since uploads are 
generally free of charge at major CSPs’. SSB query result size is shown in Table 3. Since 
many queries do not need to decrypt data, only some parts of the shared DW are transferred 
when executing SSB’s workload. Thus, the transferred data volume is greater than the volume 
of each query result, but lower than that of all shares. For example, query Q.1.3 ran on shares 
outputs 32 KB, which is greater the actual result size (11 bytes) but much lower than the vo-
lume of all shares (1.5 GB), thus incurring reasonable transfer costs. 
 
Comparison of Scheme-II to existing related approaches 
 
In this section, we compare Scheme-II to the TWH approaches presented in our state of the 
art, with respect to security and cost. Table 5 synthesizes the features and costs of all ap-
proaches, which we discuss below. 
 
Features and costs 
Thompson et al. 
(2009) 
Wang et al. 
(2011) 
Hadavi et al. 
(2012) 
Scheme-II 
Privacy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Data availability Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Data integrity     
- Inner code verifying Yes Yes Yes Yes 
- Outer code verifying No No No Yes 
Target Databases Databases Databases Data warehouses 
Data types Positive integers Positive integers Positive integers 
Integers, Reals, 
Characters, 
Strings, Dates, 
Booleans 
Shared data access     
- Data updates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
- Exact match queries No Yes Yes Yes 
- Range queries No Yes Yes No 
- Aggregation functions Yes No Yes Yes 
- OLAP queries No No No Yes 
Costs     
- Data storagew.r.t. original data volume 
≥ 2𝑛 
+ 1 (hash tree) 
≥ 𝑛/𝑡 
+ 𝑛/𝑡 (B++ tree 
index) 
+ signatures 
≥ 𝑛 
+ 1 (B++ tree 
index) 
≥ 𝑛/ 𝑡 − 1  
+ signatures 
- Sharing process execution time 𝑂 𝑚𝑛𝑡  𝑂 max⁡ 𝑚 log 𝑚 , 𝑚𝑛   𝑂 𝑚𝑛𝑡  𝑂 𝑚𝑛𝑡  
- Reconstructing process execution time 𝑂 𝑚𝑡2  𝑂 𝑚𝑡  𝑂 𝑚𝑡2  𝑂 𝑚𝑡2  
 
Table 5. Comparison of database sharing approaches 
 
Security 
 
All approaches handle data security, availability and integrity issues, but only ours verifies 
both the correctness of shares and the honesty of CSPs by outer and inner code verification, 
respectively. 
 
Computing cost 
 
The time complexity of Scheme-II’s sharing process is equal to TH’s and better than W’s be-
cause 𝑚 is normally much bigger than 𝑛 and 𝑡. Thence, 𝑚 log 𝑚 > 𝑚𝑛𝑡 > 𝑚𝑛. However, in 
the context of DWs, where updates are performed off-line, update performance is not as criti-
cal as in transactional databases. 
 
The time complexity of Scheme-II’s reconstructing process is again equal to TH’s and better 
than W’s. Since data decryption is part of query response time, it is critical in a DW context. 
However, shared data access is also part of query response time. In this regard, our approach 
is faster than TWH, because we can directly query shared tables, whereas TWH must perform 
ad-hoc queries, aggregate and reconstruct data to achieve the same result. For instance, W 
cannot perform any aggregation operation on shares. Thence, many shares are transferred 
back to the user for aggregation. 
 Storage cost 
 
In addition to the storage estimations provided in Table 5, let us illustrate the storage gain 
achieved with our approach through an example. Let 𝑛 = 4, 𝑡 = 3 and 𝑉 be the original data 
volume. Let us also assume that each share is not bigger than the original data it encrypts. For 
simplicity, let us finally disregard the volume of signatures that depends on user-defined pa-
rameters in all approaches. The result is shown in Table 6, with column Improvement display-
ing the storage gain achieved by Scheme-II over TWH. 
 
Approach Shared data volume Scope Improvement 
Scheme-II 
𝑛
 𝑡 − 1 
𝑉 =
4
 3 − 1 
𝑉 = 2𝑉 Shares 0% 
T 2𝑛𝑉 = 2 × 4 × 𝑉 = 8𝑉 Shares 300% 
W 
𝑛
𝑡
𝑉 +
𝑛
𝑡
𝑉 =
2𝑛
𝑡
𝑉 =
2 × 4
3
𝑉 = 2.67𝑉 Shares and indices 33% 
H 𝑛𝑉 + 𝑉 = (𝑛 + 1)𝑉 =  4 + 1 × 𝑉 = 5𝑉 Shares and indices 150% 
 
Table 6. Comparison shared data volume in Scheme-II and TWH. 
 
Data transfer cost 
 
Data transfer cost directly relates to the size of shares when loading data, and to the size of 
query results when accessing the shared database. Since all approaches allow different opera-
tions and vary in shared data volume, it is difficult to compare data transfer costs by proof. 
However, data transfer cost in our approach is cheaper in the sharing phase because the size of 
each encrypted data piece is 1/(𝑡 − 1) smaller than that of TWH. Moreover, by creating 
shared data cubes, we allow straight computations on shares, and thus only target results are 
transferred to the user, i.e., with no additional data to decrypt at the user’s. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we propose an original approach to share a DW in the cloud that simultaneously 
supports data privacy, availability, integrity and OLAP querying. Our approach is constituted 
of two schemes. Scheme-I exploits block cryptography and secret sharing to protect data and 
guarantee data privacy and availability. Moreover, Scheme-I ensures data correctness by uti-
lizing homomorphic and hash functions as signatures. Scheme-II builds upon Scheme-I to 
allow sharing and querying cloud DWs. It allows analyzing data over shares without decrypt-
ing all data first. Our security and performance analysis shows that our schemes are more ro-
bust and cheaper than similar existing techniques when storing and querying data. 
 
Future research shall run along two axes. First, we plan to further assess the cost of our solu-
tion in the cloud pay-as-you-go paradigm. Sharing data indeed implies increasing the initial 
data volume, and thus storage cost, as well as duplicating computing costs over CSPs. How-
ever, it also guarantees data availability. Hence, we plan to run monetary cost evaluations 
against classical data replication schemes. It would also be very interesting to balance the cost 
of our solution against the cost of risking data loss or theft. Moreover, parameter assignment 
affects the security of our schemes. Notably, to enforce security, big values should be as-
signed to primes 𝑃, p and number of CSPs needed to decrypt data t. In contrast, small values 
should be assigned to 𝑃, 𝑝, 𝑛 and 𝑡 to reduce execution time and data volume. Thus, a suitable 
tradeoff must be investigated. 
 Second, although we provide in this paper a raw framework for OLAPing shared data, more 
research is required to implement all operations needed in OLAP analyses, as well as incre-
mental updates. We notably plan to reuse the strategies of Wang et al. (2011) and Hadavi et 
al. (2012) to achieve range and match queries, e.g., by implementing shared B+ tree indices. 
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